How New York’s “Slayer Rule” Could Affect Your Estate Plan

In most cases, New York courts will enforce the distribution of a person’s property as specified in their will or similar estate planning documents. One exception is what is known as the “Slayer rule.” This rule dates back to an 1899 decision from the New York Court of Appeals holding that a “wrongdoer” cannot profit from their own crime at the expense of the victim’s estate.
That 1899 case, Riggs v. Palmer, involved a 16-year-old who poisoned and thereby killed his grandfather. The grandfather previously executed a will leaving most of his estate to said grandson. The Court of Appeals subsequently held “that by reason of the crime of murder committed upon the grandfather [the grandson] is deprived of any interest in the estate left by him.”
Surrogate Rules Grandfather’s Death Did Not Invalidate Life Estate Deed
The Riggs case addressed a situation where the killer’s interest in the victim’s property only vested upon the latter’s death. But what about a case where the victim’s interest allegedly vested before they killed the victim? Interestingly, the Slayer rule does not necessarily apply.
A Surrogate’s Court in upstate New York recently confronted this very scenario. This case, Matter of DePonceau, involved yet another instance of a grandson killing their grandfather. According to court records, the grandson in this case told his roommate that he had shot and killed his grandfather. The roommate then called the police. Officers found the grandson in a nearby park carrying a rifle, which the young man turned on himself and used to commit suicide before the police could arrest him.
About a year before these tragic events, the grandfather executed a deed transferring ownership of his house to his grandson, while retaining a life estate for himself. The grandfather also retained a limited power of appointment, which meant he could divest the grandson of his interest in the property and leave it to someone else. The grandfather never exercised that power prior to his death, however, so by law the grandson’s interest in the property had vested.
This led to litigation between the grandfather’s estate and the grandson’s estate. The grandfather’s estate argued that since the grandson “directly caused” the grandfather’s death, he forfeited his interest in the property. The grandson’s estate replied that since his interest had already vested, Riggs did not apply. The grandfather’s estate argued that the interest had not fully vested, since it was subject to the grandfather’s power of appointment until the moment he died.
The Surrogate’s Court determined that even if the grandson met the definition of “wrongdoer” as contemplated by the Riggs decision–that is, someone convicted of murder or manslaughter in the victim’s death–and subsequent case law, under these particular circumstances the grandson did not forfeit his interest in the grandfather’s property. As the Surrogate saw it, there was no evidence before the court that the grandson intentionally killed his grandfather to “accelerate” his inheritance, as was the case with the grandson in Riggs. And unlike a bequest in a will, the grandson’s interest was vested by a life estate deed, which granted him certain rights over the property while his grandfather was still alive.
Contact a Brooklyn Estate Planning Lawyer
While nobody plans for a scenario where they are killed by a family member, it is not uncommon to make or revise an estate plan based on changed circumstances and relationships within the family. If you need legal advice and assistance from a qualified Brooklyn estate planning lawyer, contact Yeung & Associates, PLLC, today at 718-889-7568 to schedule a consultation. Our office speaks Mandarin & Cantonese in addition to English.
Source:
scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7192217490998360019
